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INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: INVESTOR BEHAVIOR A1'W UNDERPRICING
ABSTRACT
A questionnaire survey of investors in initial public offerings (IPO's)
was undertaken to learn about patterns of investor behavior that might be
relevant to theories of their underpricing. Respondents were asked for
their perception of the allocation process, their concern with stockbroker
or underwriter reputation, their theories of IPO underpricing, and their
communications and information sources. Results are interpreted as
supporting the notion that there is an element of truth in some existing
theories of IPO underpricing. and also suggesting different hypotheses. The
impresario hypothesis is that underwriters deliberately underprice to obtain
publicity and promote enthusiasm. Other hypotheses suggested by the results
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INVESTORBEHAVIOR ANDUNDERPRICING
Wehave collected questionnaire survey data concerning investorsin
initial public offerings (IPO's) of common stock tolearn about their
behavior, with the purpose of providing new informationthat will help us to
differentiate among several theories of the IPOmarketJ The theories are
used to explain the puzzling phenomenon that IPO'stend to be underpriced by
their underwriters. i. e. •haveextremely high average returns between the
offering date and the aftermarket. and that the extentof the underpricing
tends to show persistent variations through time; seeIbbotson [19751,
Ibbotson and Jaffe [1975]. Ritter (19841. and Ibbotson.Sindelar and titter
11988].
The premise of this survey work is that more information on parameters
of investor behavior is needed to understand the IPO underpricing
phenomenon.The present Tmliteratureishampered by the reliance primarily
on conventional theoretical preEuppositiOns thatinvestors are expected
utility maximizers. These presuppositions do notallow any serious
consideration of the views of the IPO underpricing that are commonly
expressed in the industry and in the news media: thatunderpricing is
deliberately planned by underwriters to create a satisfiedclientele and
that periods of high demand are due to speculative fervor onthe part of
work was undertaken with the collaboration of JohnPound.
12
investors.
There is no reason why the behavior of issue prices of IPO's should be
understood primarily in terms of any concepts of efficient markets or
rational optimizing behavior of investors. These prices are not market
prices, one cannot trade freely at these prices, so apparent profit
opportunities cannot be exploited by "smart money". Since the shares in
lEO's are ratIoned, a viable strategy for underwriters is to price LEO's
with a particular segment of the market in mind, excluding others who might
see profit opportunities. Thus, investor behavior, the behavior of the
masses of investors or less rational subgroups of investors, might be an
especially important factor in models of these prices, just as models of
less rational consumer behavior might explain why retail prices of clothing
like $9.99 are more common than prices like $10.01.
Data collection on investor behavior may also serve a role in
confirming existing theories of IPO underpricing. For example, it would be
supportive of the information asymmetry theories if we were to find that
investors were aware of such asymmetries and offered them when discussing
the IPO market. It would be supportive of the quid-pro-quo theories if
investors were aware that giving business to a stockbroker is expected to
result in a large allocation in a winning IPO.
2Examples are not hard to find. It is matter-of-factly stated that
"The brokerage firms do this [underprice) so that the shares appreciate in
the aftermarket and create a satisfied shareholder base for the company."
(Fred R. Bleakely, "The Current Bonanza in New Issues," New York Tines Nay
1S, 1983, III 10:3.) In one of the hot markets it is stated that "The
investing public's keen appetite for securities, reflected by rising prices
and the most active dealings in years on the New York Stock Exchange, is
spurring a vigorous search for new stock issues by underwriters and their
agents." (Mitchell Corden, "More Companies Offer Stock for First Time;
Rising Demand a Lure," Wall Street Journal, February 17, 1961, l;l.)
2It should be stressed that the effort here should not be viewed as
trying to choose among competing theories of IPO underpricing, as if only
one of these theories is right. Since offering prices are not market prices
underwriters have a lot of latitude in their pricing decision, and the
freedom to let a lot of considerations affect their behavior. As with many
decisions in life, the outcome is the result of the weighing of a lot of
pros and cons. It is by no means a sign of a weak theory if we say that
many such considerations figure into the pricing decision.
The questionnaire survey reported here asks investors about their
trading histories, their perceptions of the allocation process, the
perceived importance of broker and underwriter reputation, the theories of
IPO investors, and their communications patterns and information sources.
Then, this paper will offer some interpretations and conjectures as to the
sources of IPO underpricing. I will discuss an "impresario hypothesi&' for
IPO underwriting, and offer as well as an "investor risk perceptions
hypothesis" and a "fairness-relationship hypothesis."
A. Survey Desien
A.l TheThreeSamples
Questionnaires were sent out to three samples, the first two
representing IPO investors, the third (the control sample) representing a
random sample of all investors. In all three samples, respondents were
asked to name an IPO (or, for the control sample, a common stock) that they
had purchased recently, which would be referred to in subsequent questions
as the COMPANY. This was done so that we could ask concrete questions about
3one investment, rather than ask respondents to think of all the investments
they had made.
There is some difficulty in obtaining a list of IPO investors that is
truly random. For the IPO investors, we obtained two lists of investors
that we thought would contain a high proportion of such investors, and yet
contain no obvious important sample selection biases.
IPO Investors sample 1 (IPO-l)
We purchased a mailing list of probably active high income investors
from a mailing list company Il.S.Ponton, mc, a specialist in investor
mailing lists. This list, entitled their "High Grade Multi-Investor' list
is described in the Ponton Investor List Catalog Vol.. VIII by names on
three or more mailing lists -networth generally over $250,000.00." This
list is composed of names on three or more of the Ponton mailing lists that
are suggestive of high-income active investors. The Fonton lists are from
directories of customers of brokerage houses, lists of investment seminar
attenders, lists of respondents to ads relating to investments, lists of
persons mentioned in newspaper articles, yacht owners, aircraft owners,
doctors, etc. Appearing on three or more of these lists is taken to
indicate a likely active investor. Most of the lists described in their
catalog are used to produce the high grade multi-investor list. However, no
use is made of some of their more unusual lists (lists of gamblers, cattle.
or new movie investors). We were given a random selection from the entire
United States, from which we sent out 500 questionnaires in February, 1987.
One week after the initial mailing a postcard was sent reminding them to
fill out the questionnaire, three weeks after the initial mailing a second
letter was sent with a replacement questionnaire. We received 53 responses
4from investors who said they had purchased or seriously considered
purchasing an IPO. Note that the response rate on our questionnaire should
not be calculated as 53/500, since the number of individuals in our sample
who had purchased or seriously considered purchasing an IFO was likely to be
less than 500.
IFO investors Samole 2 (IPO-2) We purchased a mailing list of
subscribers to the publication New Issues Alert. New Issues Alert.
published by Export Newsletter Association in Boca Raton Florida, is an 8-
page monthly reporting on new stock offerings. The subscription price for
the newsletter is $119.00 per year. One thousand questionnaires were sent
to these in February 1987; no more mailings were made to these. We had 100
responses who indicated that they purchased or considered purchasing an IPO.
Control Sanole (CONTROL) We purchased a list of high income Americans
provided by Survey Sampling, Inc. •whospecialize in producing true random
samples of the United States population. This list was not intended to be
an investor list. They described the list we purchased as "geographic area:
all, continental U. S.. demographic selection: $70,000.00 to no limit. •Five
hundred questionnaires were sent out in July. 1986. One week later, a
reminder postcard was sent, and then two more reminder letters with
replacement questionnaires went out, the last in September 1986. For this
sample, the first question on the questionnaire inquired whether they had
purchased common stock. We received 156 usable completed responses who
answered yes.
Analysis of Samples
Table I shows some comparisons of the three samples on various
5measures.
The flU-i sample closely resembles the CONTROL sample in most dimensions.
This is as we would expect, since we know of no biases which would make
these samples different from a random sample of the wealthy investing
public. The average income is a little higher in the IPO-l sample.
representing, in effect, a different cutoff income for the samples.
The IP0-2 sample is somewhat different. They are more likely to describe
their investments as risky than are individuals in the other samples. They
are somewhat more likely to use "sophisticated" investments such as futures
and stock options, and much more likely to have invested in gold or silver.
Since they have taken the trouble to subscribe to a specialized publication.
it is not surprising that they are more likely to do unusual investments.
B. Survey Results
It should be noted first that the IPO surveys were railed out during a
"cold" market for IPO's. According to ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (19881,
the average initial return on IPO's in 1981 was 10.39% and in 1986 was
9.99%, compared with the average initial return of 20.25% for 1977 to 1987.
Since the IPO market was (and still is) cold, we are not in the best
situation to find evidence of fads or related judgmental errors among IPO
investors. Still, the initial returns in the 10% range are quite high when
compared with other investments, since the return is earned over a few days
at most.
Trading history among or respondents (Table 2) shows that most IPO
investors are repeat purchasers of IPO's. They do not generally "flip,"
that is buy and sell promptly in the aftermarket, instead the investment
6tends to be made for something on the order of a year. Most IPO investors
deal with only one broker, and despite the rationing of Itt's which are
highly profitable on average, make no attempt to find other brokers who will
ration them shares in the Itt's. These results are consistent with a
relationship of trust between client and broker.
Investors in IPO's do perceive that the allocation process works as it
has been hypothesized in the IPO literature (Table 3). Their allocations of
shares, and especially in winning 120's, are thought to be related to
business given the broker. The average investor reports getting about 80%
of the shares requested, and only about 60% of the shares requested in
winning lPO's. This percent is low enough, given the high variance of 120
returns, to be consistent with the notion that the expected initial return
is not high if weighted by the amounts one is allocated. The fact that the
second percent quoted above is lower shows that the investors are aware of
the vinner's curse phenomenon in the IPO market.
Investors in 120's are very much concerned with the reputation of both
the broker and the underwriter (Table 4). Slightly less than half of the
investors rely on stockbrokers for the decision to buy in an 120. Investors
conf in that they feel they need some compensation for the winner's curse
problem (they stay away from IPO's that other investors know more about) in
accordance with Rock's [1986] theory of IPO underpricing.
Respondents were asked for the reason why they invested in the company:
Can you state, in a few words, the theory that led you to invest in (or
consider investing in) the COMPANY's stock? Put the theory as you would
have put it to convince a trusted friend to buy the stock. -Themost common
answer for both lPO samples was to refer to a story about the product or
7concept of the firm. Of the IPO-1. respondents, 25% said this, of the IPO-2
respondents. 38.5% said this. These were generally nonquantitative stories
about the quality" of the product or the outlook for growth, without any
explicit evaluation whether the IPO was priced well. In an earlier paper
(Shiller and Pound (19881) about stock market investors in general we noted
that investors tend to tell stories about the stock without reference to
price, as if price did not matter, and we find this tendency in the IPO
market as well. The second most common answer for both IPO groups was that
a stockbroker had advised the purchase (21% of IPO-l and 13% of IPO-2),
followed by claims that the management of the issuing firm was good (13% of
IPO-i and 13% of IPO-2). References to historically high returns on IPO's
were made by 8% of the IFO-l investors and 10% of the IP0-2 investors.
References to "hot" underwriters were made by 5% of the IPO-2 investors, but
by none of the IPO-l investors. From all these answers, it is apparent that
the modal answer is one that the investor chose the IPO because of its
product or concept. While the historically high returns on IPO's were
mentioned by only 8 to 10 percent of the respondents, we think that the
evidence suggests that these high returns are very much on investors' minds.
A question like this is perhaps construed as asking for a story or concept,
and not a factor specific to the entire IPO market.
Respondents were asked to classify the reasons they give, see Table 5,
top. IPO investors are somewhat more likely than our control investors to
think that they are buying in IPO's for reasons of market psychology. There
is some tendency among IPO investors to think that they are riding a wave of
investor popularity. Somewhat less than half of the IPO investors appear to
be trading on the IPO market itself, thinking that IPO's do well because of
8investor psychology. This evidence is consistent with the traditional
notion of a self-conscious speculative bubble.
Communications patterns among IPO investors (table 6) are conducive to
the sort of interpersonal interaction that is necessary for speculative
enthusiasm to develop. However, by some measures this communication is less
intense than in ordinary issues. The subscribers to the New Issue Alert
seem particularly to be relativeloners, who read and invest rather than
talk and invest. However, interpersonal communication operates at a
substantial level for all investors.
Most investors had not done any careful calculations or study before
investing in their IPO. Thus, the reputation of the broker and underwriter
is especially likely to be important to them, and the sense of trust in
their relationship.
C. Speculative Enthusiasm and the Impresario Hypothesis
The idea is commonplace in the popular literature that speculative
behavior, behavior characterized by investor enthusiasm not grounded in
objective information, is important to understanding the IPO market. The
idea has been brought up In the scholarly literature but usually dismissed
with little serious attention,
The theory of speculative behavior that often seems to be suggested in
the popular literature is that an increase in investor enthusiasm between -
theoffering date and the aftermarket accounts for the increase in price
between these dates. But, just because the dynamics of price between the
offering date and the aftermarket are the concern of our speculation
9theories, does not mean that we must attribute these dynamics to changes in
investor behavior over this short interval of time. A more attractive
theory of underpricing of IPO's is that the underwriters deliberately
underprice them because of their perceptions of individual speculative
behavior, so that the price increase that tends to follow is not due to any
change in investor behavior then. Underwriters may do so if the
underpricing creates a favorable impression among their clients when price
increases in the aftermarket.
Observing one's investment increase in value by 20% within a few days
may create a vivid impression among investors, and may redound to the credit
of the stockbroker who advised the investment. If underwriters can create
such a reputation for themselves and for stockbrokers who market the issues,
then this reputation may help them to get better prices for future issues.
Issuing firms would rather that underwriters marketed their issue at a
market clearing price, but are nonetheless happy to do business with an
underwriter whose reputation increases the value of their issue above what
they could get for it if they tried to underwrite their own issue, or if
they dealt with an underwriter who was not Thot" at the time. This
impresario theory of underpricing of IPO's does not require that
underwriters have a "monopsony" as adduced the literature to explain the
intentional underpricing of issues by underwriters (see for example Ritter
(1974)).
I call this an impresario hypothesis because it is the same theory that
explains why impresarios may sometimes underprice tickets to concerts, so as
to enhance the reputation of the performer (by creating a jam-packed
auditorium and long lines for tickets) and thereby increasing the prices
10they can charge for subsequent concerts.
The impresario hypothesis is not likely to be the Qfljy explanation of
IPO underpricing. The other theories in the literature, such as the
information asymmetry and litigation avoidance theories, are likely also to
play a rote in IPO underpricing. Rut the circumstantial evidence that the
impresario underpricing does play a role in this phenomenon is substantial.
We saw above that the reputation of the stockbroker and underwriter are
important factors on the minds of IPO investors. Since as we have seen most
IPO investors do not do quantitative research on the investments themselves.
they must be trusting in others to evaluate investments for them. Investors
seem to have at hand for quick retelling the story about the investments,
but notthecomparisons that must be made to know whether the price is a
good one. Since investors are not evaluating the job stockbrokers or
underwritersare doing on such comparisons, then, they must look at the
returnsthat the broker or underwriter earned for the investor or his or her
friends in the recent past.
Itis significant that most investors do not attempt to buyan initial
publicoffering from more than one broker. While many investors are aware
of the high initial returns that IPOstend to earn, and a substantial
minorityof the investors say they would be discouraged from buying an IPO
ifthe overall market looked less encouraging, they still do not feel sure
enough about the market that they would trya serious strategy of buying all
IPO's. The majority say they would tend to stay away from an IPOthatthey
felt other investorsknew more about.
Thismeans that many investors are viewing theirpast successes with
IPO investments as related to their owninformation sources, substantially
11their knowledge of their broker and underwriter, and not as areturn just
for the fact of having invested in a random IPO. This in turn meansthat
the high initial returns are likely to be enhancing the reputationof the
underwriter of the issue.
For this theory to hold up. it is necessary that investorsdo not
generally fully realize that the high initial returns aredue to a decision
by underwriters to underprice. Other evidence suggeststhat it is likely
that most investors are at least partially fooled by such a strategy.In a
questionnaire study of home buyers in a recent Californiareal estate boom,
(Case and Shiller [1988)) we found that the underpricing thatresulted in
selling prices above the asking price in about 8% of sales was
misinterpreted by buyers. They tended to view the selling prices above
asking prices as evidence of investor panic, rather than of theoccasional
underpricing errors that must be made by some sellers in an up market.
While changes in investor enthusiasm over a few days do not play a role
in the price change between the offering and the aftenarket. we hypothesize
that changing enthusiasm does play a role in the dynamics of the "hot" issue
markets that occur fromtimeto time. The dynamics of "hot" issue markets
are sufficiently slow that their appearance and disappearance could be
explained in terms of contagion models of investor communications, like the
one described in Shiller and Pound (1989). In tenos of average initial
returns, hot markets come and go over periods of years. There was a "hot"
IFO market in 1961, another in 1967-8, another in the early 1970's, another
in the late 1970's and early 1980's. We hypothesize that there are periodic
"fads" in which investors show great enthusiasm for IPO's, and that part of
the dynamics of the fads is the observation among investors of the high
12initial returns. During these fads underwriters and stockbrokers mayfind
it profitable to sell very underpriced new issues to generate publicity and
protect their reputation as dealers who can get their investing clients in
on the action. The tendency for high initial returns to come and go is
likely to be the same as the tendency for impresarios to underprice some
concerts and not others: one underprices a concert only if one thinks that
the impression given by the underpricing will pay off in subsequent
receipts, which is only if concertgoers are paying attention to the
underpricing end are willing to believe that the performer is a star.
Ultimately, underwriters can use very high initial returns to facilitate the
spread of fads only if a fad is already in the works. No one can manage
public opinion so well as to know how predictably to start a fad.
Evidence that there is some truth to this interpretation of the
dynamics of hot and cold markets takes several forms. The extent of
interpersonal communications documented above would certainly support a
contagion of interest story. Moreover, respondents report that the
communications had a serious nature: they tended to think that they made
friends likely to purchase IPO's. Such a contagion of interest story is
further supported by the observation that volume of new issues tends to be
high 6 to 12 months after periods of high initial returns (Ibbotson,
Sindelar and Ritter (1988]). Such a lag is what one might expect of
contagion models of investor communications (Shiller and Pound, 1989].
Other Behavioral Hvootheses for IPO Undervricjn
Other hypotheses relevant to IPO underpricing are also suggested by
these results.These are not proposed as stand-alone theories of IPO
13underpricing. but as considerations that underwritershave in mind when
deciding how much to underprice an issue.
One is a simple investor risk perception hypothesis. Sincethere is
great uncertainty as to the price that ashare will have in the aftermarket.
investors in IPO's must be compensated for this uncertainty. Thisis
different from the risk aversion hypothesis discussed by Tinic (1988),who
speaks of the risk aversion of underwriters rather than ofthe ultimate
investors. The risk that individual investors in IPO'sincuris
substantial: Ibbotson (1975) found that for the period 1960 through 1969
investors in IPO's had about an equal chance of making positive or negative
return, the positive expected return coming because the distribution of
returns is positively skewed.
Since, as we have seen, investors in IPO's do not diversify away the
risk of their IPOinvestments,investing in only a small number themselves.
the shape of this distribution is likely to matter to their sense of
satisfaction in their investment. They are likely to have an impression as
to the shape of this distribution for investments sold by their broker, from
their own experience and from the conversations with friends that were
documented above. That the shape of the distribution of an individual
investment should matter to an investor, rather than the contribution of
that investment to the investor's portfolio, is of course contrary to modern
portfolio theory. 3ut it is consistent with the principle of "mental
accounting" proposed by Shefrin and Statman (1985), drawing on the Prospect
Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The mental accounting principle is
that "decision makers tend to segregate the different types of gambles into
separate accounts, and then apply prospect theoretic decision rules to each
14account by ignoring possible interactions. Of course, if we discard
modern portfolio theory for the pricing of IPO's it does not follow that we
should discard the theory for other applications. As noted above, the lEO
market is special in that quantities are rationed to a certain clientele.
Underwriters may tend to feet that if they priced IPO's so as to make
expected initial returns equal to zero, thereby causing most investments in
IPO's to result in a loss, it would destroy the sense of good will that
investors feel toward the stock broker. The observation of Beatty and
Ritter (1986] that expected initial return is positively related to ex ante
uncertainty would appear to be supportive of this investor perception
theory.
Another possible consideration for the time pattern of IPO initial
returns is a "fairness-relationship" hypothesis. Since the IPO investment
is made within an ongoing relationship of trust between investor and broker,
considerations of "fair pricing" may play an important role, Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler Ll9811 have documented that such considerations play an
important role in many economic decisions, and that the decisions as to what
is fair are based on a complicated set of social norms. Case and Shiller
(1988] have documented that such fairness considerations play a role in
certain investment decisions as well. It could be that some conventional
standards for lEO pricing are applied, and investors feel that they are
treated fairly if their initial returns mimic the rest of the market,
whether hot or cold.
One aspect of the lEO underpricing that seems not to be explained in
terms of the impresario hypothesis (or any of the other hypotheses in the
3shefrin and Statman, [1985].
15literature) is the periods of persistent nesative initial returns.
According to Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1988J, the year 1973 had an
average initial return of -17.82%, 1974 had -6.98%, and 1975 had an -1.86%.
The appearance of persistent bust markets as well as persistent hot earkets
suggests that there is a sort of sluggishness in underwriter pricing,
resulting in both positive or negative initial returns depending on market
price relative to the conventional price.
Tinic (1988) has proposed that underpricing of IPO's may be due to the
threat of litigation. Underpricing of IPO's is taken to reduce the
probability that underwriters or stockbrokers will be sued for
misrepresenting the issue. Tinic's argument is in fact a special case of
the fairness-relationship hypothesis. Litigation is not the only way to
express displeasure at an underwriter. Tinic's own evidence suggests that
the fairness-relationship hypothesis extends beyond the effects of formal
litigation. Tinic collected data on 70 IPO's in the years 1923 to 1930,
before the Securities Act of 1933 which has been the basis for litigation in
IPO cases. He found no evidence of such litigation in this period. He
found that the initial returns were lower in this period than in the post-
1933 period, but still lsrge and positive.
16Table I
Characteristics of the Samples
IP0-1 IP0-2 CONTROL
1.sample Size 53 100 156
II.Average Income $181,400 $53,600 $113,000
III. Other Investments: 23% 29% 35%
Savings Bonds 23% 29% 35%
Commodity Futures 19% 36% 35%
Treasury BIlls 29% 20% 34%
Gold or Silver 17% 49% 19%
Stock Options 25% 37% 26%




VI. "Most other holdings are risky and speculative."
22.0% 55%
VII. "Most other holdings are safe and unexciting."
78.0% 45%
VIII. "Are you currently an investment professional? (for example.
stockbroker, investment advisor, or investment banker)
7.8%yes 6.2% yes 5.3% yes
17Table 2
Investment History





in 1983 0.333 0.844
(0.115> (0.214)
in 1984 0.452 1.124
(0.144) (0.224)
in 1985 0.667 1.373
(0.160) (0.232)
in 1986 0.738 1.850
(0.158) (0.283)
What is the shortest period for which you held an initial public offering,
from the date of purchase to the date of sale?
IPO-1 IPO-2
38.4 weeks 21.3 weeks
(10.9 weeks) (3.3 weeks)
What is the average or typical period for which you held an initial public
offering, from the date of purchase to the date of sale?
IPO.l IPO-2
68.4 weeks 48.5 weeks
(10.8 weeks) (4.9 weeks)
Approximately what percent of your holdings of stocks, bonds and other





Have you ever attempted to purchase stock in one initial public offering
through nore than one stockbroker?
IPO-l IPO-2
27.5% yes 33.7% yes
72.5%no 66.3%no
(6.2%) (4.8%)
What is the naximum nwnber of brokers from whomyou attempted to purchase





Investor Perceptions of Allocation Process
Do you find that you are more Likely to be allocated shares in an IPO if you
do a lot of other business with the stockbroker?
120-1 120-2
59.5% yes 63.3% yes
9.5% no 5.6% no
31.0% no opinion 31.1% no
Do you find that you are more likely to be given shares in a winning IPO if




33.3% no opinion 26.7%noopinion
Thinking back across all the 120's you've tried to purchase, how many shares
have you generally been allocated, compared to how many you wanted to get?




Thinking back across all the 120's you've tried to purchase, consider those
120's whose price actually went up 10% or more right after the offering
date, making a nice profit for those who were allocated shares. What percent




Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
19Table 4
Importance of Underwriter and Stockbroker Reputation
Would you be more likely to buy an IPO that is underwritten by a particular
investment bank or investment bank consortium?
IPO-l IPO-2
58.3% yes 56.1%yes
41.7% no 43.9% no
(7.1%) (5.0%)
Do you knowthename of the lead underwriter for this IPO?
IPO-l IPO-2
39.7%yes 63.8% yes
60.3% no 36.2% no
(6.7%) (5.2%)
Was a stockbroker influential in your decision whether to buy stock in the
COKPMJY?
IP0-l IPO-2 CONTROL
41.5% yes 46.5% yes 36.6% yes
58.5% no 53.5% no 63.4% no
(6.8%) (5.0%) (3.9%)
Do you generally stay away from IPO's that you think other investors know
wore about unless you think they're a really great buy?
IPO-l IPO-2
71.7% yes 50.5% yes
28.3% no 49.5% no
(6.6%) (5.2%)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
20Table S
Investment Theories
Can you state, in a few words, the theory that led you to invest in (or
consider investing in) the COMPANY'sstock?Put the theory as you would
have put it to convince a trusted friend to buy the stock Which of
the following better describes the above theory?
IPO-l IPO-2 CONTROL
A theory about the kinds of 41.7% 63.7% 34.6%
stocks that are becoming (7.5%) (5.0%) (4.2%)
attractive to investors
A theory about fundamentals, 56.3% 36.3% 65.4%
such as profits or dividends (7.5%) (5.0%) (4.2%)
Do you remember thinking that purchasing stock in any initial pubLic
offering is likely to be a good investment regardless of the fundamentals of
the particular company, because these investments generally do well?
IPO-l IPO-2
33.0% yes 40.6% yes
66.0% no 59.2% no
(7.0%) (5.0%)
Do you remember thinking that regardless of the fundamental value of the






If the IPO marketingeneral had looked less encouraging, that would
have discouraged me from investing in theCOMPANY.
IPO-l IPO-2
43.2%yes 41.5% yes
56.8% no 58.5% no
(8.1%) (5.4%)
Prior to purchasing (or considering purchasing) stock in the COMPANY, did
you feel that it was important to purchase COMPANY stock right away, due to
some short-lived profit opportunity?
IPO-1 IPO-2 CONTROL
52.0%yes 66.7% yes 33.3% yes
48.0% no 33.3% no 66.7% no
(7.1%) (4.7%) (4.0%)
21Table 6
InvestorCommunications and Information Sources
Was another person you spoke to, besides a stockbroker,influential in your
decision whether to buy stock in the COMPANY?
IPO-1 IPO-2 CONTROL
49.1% yes 21.4% yes 32.9% yes
50.9% 110 78.6%no 67.1% no
(6.9%) (4.1%) (3.8%)
Was the fact that someone (whom you know or know of) bought stock inthe
COMPANY influentialinyourdecision whether to buy?
IPO-l IPO-2 CONTROL
37.7% yes 14.1% yes 28.1% yes
62.3% no 85.9% no 11.9% no
(6.7%) (3.5%) (3.6%)
How many friends, business associates. and other potential investors would
you guess you have talked to about the COMPANY sincethe time you first




Howmany of these people would you guess became very likely to purchase




When you made the decision whether to purchase the COMPANY stock, had you
recently conducted your own analysis of the COMPANY and its likely stock
performance? This miglit involve using Value Line, other reports,
computerized databases, etc.
IPO-l IPO-2 CONTROL
23.5% yes 36.8% yes 23.1% yes
76.5% no 63.2% no 76.9% no
(S.9%) (4.9%) (3.5%)
Haveyou done (or read about or talked with others about) any calculations
of what the true fundamental value of a share in the COMPANY
was, and compared the price of a share with this value?
IPO-l IPO-2
37.3%yes 20.4% yes
62.7% no 79.6% no
(6.8%) (4.1%)
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